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Aumann (1976) put forward a formal definition of  common knowlebge and used it to 
I 
prove that two "like minded" individuals cannot "agree to disagree" in the lollowing sense. If 
they start from a common prior and update the probability of an event E (4ing  Bayes' rule) on 
the basis of private information, then it cannot be common knowledge bet  een them that 
individual 1 assigns probability p to E and individual 2 assigns probability  to E with p z  q. In  1 
other words, if  their posteriors of event E are common knowledge then thed must coincide. 
Aumann's Agreement Theorem has given rise to a large literature which  review in this paper. 
The results are classified according to whether they are probabilistic  or qualitative. 
Particular attention is paid to the issue of how to interpret the notion  consistency as a 
(local) property of  belief hierarchies. 1.  Introduction 
Aurnann  (1976) put forward a formal definition of  common  kna 
prove that two "like minded" individuals cannot "agree to disagree" in  I 
they start from a common prior and update the probability of an event E 
the  basis  of  private  information  then  it  cannot  be  common  knowledj 
individual 1 assigns probability p to E and individual 2 assigns probabilit 
other words, if  their posteriors of event E are common knowledge then th 
celebrated result captures the intuition that the fact that somebody else t 
from yours is an  important piece of  information which should induce y~ 
opinion. This process of revision will continue until consensus is reached. 
Aumam's original result has given rise to a large literature on the t 
in this paper. We shall base our exposition on the distinction between Baj 
versions and qualitative versions of  the notion of agreeing to disagree. 
2.  Illustration of the logic of agreeing to disagr 
Imagine two scientists who agree on everything. They agree that th 
must be one of  seven, call them a,  f3,  y, 6, E, <,  q. They also agree on the r 
these possibilities, which they take to be as illustrated in Figure 1: 
rledge and used it to 
e following sense. If 
lsing Bayes'  rule) on 
: between  them  that 
q to E with p # q. In 
I  must coincide. This 
s  a different opinion 
1 to revise your own 
pic, which we review 
sian (or quantitative) 
true law of  Nature 
lative likelihood of 
Figure  1 Experiments can be conducted to learn more. An experiment leads to a pa 
For example, if  the true law of  Nature is a and you performed experiment 
leann that it cannot be 6 or E or r/ but you still would not know which is th 
amcwg the remaining ones. Suppose that the scientists agree that Scientist 
experiment 1 and Scientist 2 will perfom1 experiment 2. They also agree t 
wol;~ld  lead to a partition of  the states as  illustrated in Figure 2: 
Experiment 1  : 
Experiment 2: 
Figure  2 
f 
Suppose that they are interested in establishing the truth of  a proposition I 
event E = {a,  y, 6, E).  Initially they agree that the probability that E is tr 
tion of the above set. 
then you would 
rue law of  Nature 
will perform 
t each experiment 
ht  is represented by 
is: Before they perform the experiments they also realize that, depending on what the true law of 
Nature is, after the experiment they will have an updated probability of evebt E conditional on 
what the experiment has revealed. For example, they agree that if  one perfws  Experiment 1 
and the true state is p (so that E is actually false) then the experiment will  the information 
I = {a,  p, y) and Bayesian updating (which they agree to be the correct wag of  updating 
probabilities) will lead to the following new probability of event E: 
Similarly for every other possibility. Thus we can attach to every cell of eadh experiment a new 
updated probability of  E, as illustrated in Figure 3: 
I 
Note the interesting fact that sometimes experiments,  although they  are informative (that is, they  reduce your 
state of  uncertainty) might actually induce you to become more confident of  the truth of something that is false: 
in this case you increase your subjective probability that E is true from 75% to 86%, a though E is actually false! 
( Recall that we have assumed that the true state is (3.)  I Experiment 1  :  I 
I 
E = {a,  y, 6, : 
Experiment 2: 
Prob(E) = 15/21 
Figure  3 
Suppose now that each scientist goes to her laboratory and perforn 
experiment (Scientist 1 Experiment 1 and Scientist 2 Experiment 2). Assu 
state of Nature is <.  Afterwards they exchange email messages informin, 
new subjective estimates of event E. Scientist 1 says that she now attaches 
E, .while Scientist 2 says that she attaches probability 15/21 to E. So their  I 
/ 
surprisingly, since they have performed different experiments and have th 
different information). Should they be happy with these estimates? Obvio~ 
Scientist 2.  She hears that Scientist 1  has a new updated probability of  121 
she deduce? That the true state is not q,.  She can thus revise her knowledg 
eliiminating q  from her information set. Then she will need to re-compute 
s the respective 
ne also that the true 
; each other of  their 
probability 12/14 to 
stimates disagree (not 
:refore collected 
sly not. Consider 
14.  From this what can 
:  partition by 
:he probability of E as shown in the following figure. Similarly, Scientist 1 learns that the true st 
revises her information partition and estimate of  E as illustrated in Figure 
Scientist 1: 
true state  is 5  I 
Scientist 2: 
~te  cannot be 6, hence 
4. 
Figure  4 
Nolw  they inform each other of  their new subjective estimates: 719 for Sci  ntist 1 and 15/17 for 
Scientist 2. Again, there is disagreement. Should they accept such disagre ment? The answer is,  \ 
again, No. Scientist 1 does not learn anything from the new estimate of  ~dientist  2, but Scientist 
2 does learn something, namely that the state cannot be y. Hence she will  evise her information  t 
paliition and estimate of the probability of  E, as illustrated in Figure 5:  ~ Scientist 1  : 
E = {a,  y,  6,  d 
Scientist 2: 
true state  I 
Notice that at this stage they finally agree on the probability of  E and indet 
knowledge that both estimate this probability to be 719 = 78%  (before the 
ante: probability of E was 24/32 = 75%;  note that with the experiments anc 
information they have gone further from the truth!). 
Notice that before the last step (leading to it being common knowlc 
both scientists) it was not common knowledge between the two what prl 
attached to E.  When one scientist announced his subjective estimate, th 
that announcement  informative  and  revised her own estimate  accordin; 
it becomes common 
xperiments the ex 
:he exchange of 
~ge  that P(E) =  719 for 
lability each scientist 
other scientist found 
y.  At  the end of  the process of exchanges, the announcement by one scientist of  his estimate  id not make the other 
scientist change her estimate. In a sense further announcements became p  intless, occasioned no 
stqxise, revealed nothing new.  ."  ~ 
Although this example suggests that (if the true state is  ) the scifntist will end up with 
exactly the same information set, this is not true in general.  i 
i 
3. Formal statement of Aumam's result 
I 
I 
In this section we provide a fonnal and precise statement of  Au  (1976) result - 
known as the Agreement Theorem -  which was proved  within the  knowledge and 
common knowledge. Extensions of  the result  to the more general  and common 
belief will be examined in Section.  ~ 
Let 52  be a set of states. There are two individuals and suppose t  at they start with the  h 
same prior probability distribution  p : Q -+ [0,1] on  SZ  ( define, for  'very E  Q,  p(E) =  t 
p(w) ). Individual  i receives private information  (the nature of  the  rivate  information  is 
oaE  I 
common knowledge between the two) according to the information partit/on  .Ti.  For every state 
I 
w E:  51,  Ii(w) denotes the cell of  i's partition tt,at contains o.  Assume th  t, for every i E (1, 2)  d 
and o E SZ,  p(Ii(u))  f 0.  i 
P  Q 
.  The knowledge operator of  individual i, Ki : 2  +  2 ,  is defindd by K,E = {o  E Q : 
I 
/  Q  Q 
Ii(u) G E}. The common knowledge operator K, : 2  +  2  is defined by:  i 
That is, an event E is common knowledge between the two if  both know  ,  both know that both  F 
know E, etc. ad infiniturn.  Let 1, be the meet (finest common coarsening) of the partitions 1,  and 4 and denote by I,(w)  the cell of  I* that contains co.  Aumam (1976) provF that, for every event 
E, ICE = {o  E  Q : I,(o) c  E). 
the event  that  individual  i's  posterior  probability of  E is a.  In  the  exsmple of  the previous 
section,  for  Scientist  2  we  have  that - after the  experiment  and  before any  exchange  of 
information with the other scientist - (1 p2(E)  = 6  11 = {a,  (3,  a), where E I=  {a,  y,  6,  E}. 
Aumann's Agreement Theorem.  Let 52 be a set of states and Guppose that two 
individuals 1 and 2 have the same prior probability distribution  p : 8 4  [/3,1] on 8  sartisfying 
the property that for every i E { 1,2) and o  E  52,  p(I,(o))  # 0. Let E be an event and let 
a,b~  [0,1].  Suppose that at some state o it is common knowledge that indikidual 1's posterior 
probability of  E (given his information at co) is a and 2's posterior probability of E (given her 
inflormation  at o)  is b. Then a = b. In other words, individuals who start wlth the same prior 
cannot agree to disagree. Formally, 
The theorem is a consequence of  the following lemma. 
LEMMA 1.  Fix an arbitrary event F and let {P,, ..., Pm}  be a partilion of F (thus F = P, u 
... u Pm  and any two P and P,  with j t  k are non-empty and disjoint). Suqpose that p(E 1 PJ)  = a 
J 
foir all j = 1, ..., m. Then p(E  )  F) = a. 
2 
For  every  E,  I  G  52  such  that  p(I)  #  0,  p(E([) is  the  conditional  probabilityi  of  E  given  I,  defined  by p(E n  P,) 
PmofofLemm 1.  p(E I P,) = 
p(P,)  .  Hence, since  p(E I  P,)  a,  we have that  4  1 
p(E n P.) = a p(P,). Adding over j, the LHS becomes p(E n F) and the RH  becomes a p(F) (by 
J 
definition of  probability measure). Hence p(E 1 F) = 




Proof of the Agreement Theorem Let I,(o)  be the cell of the comm  n knowledge  0 
4.  Bayesian extensions of Aumann's result  ~ 
partition containing w. Consider individual 1. I,(@)  is a union of cells of I,, 
partition of  individual 1. On each such cell 1's conditional probability of E 
Aumann's Agreement theorem has been extended in several directi  ns. In this section we 
consider probabilistic or "Bayesian" extensions. 
the information 
is a. By Lemma 1, 
I.  From events to expectations of random variables. A  result can be 
extended from the probability of  an event to the expectation of  a random 
the following extensions were proved by Milgrom and Stokey (1982), 
Geanakoplos (1983), Rubinstein and Wolinski (1990). 
p(~  I  I,(o)) =a.  A similar reasoning for individual 2 leads to p(E  1 I,(w)) = b.  Hence a = b. 
1.  Let f  be a random variable on  Q  and a and b two distinct numbers.  en there is no o  at 
which it is common knowledge that, conditional on her information,  1 believes 
that the expectation of f  is a and, conditional on his information, 2 bel'eves that the 
3  1 
expectation is b.  i 
3 
Note that Aurnann's  result is a special case of  this: take f to be the characteristic function of event E. 2.  Let f  be a random variable on  Q  and a a number. Then there is no d at which it is common 
knowledge that, conditional on her information, individual 1 believes  at the expectation of 
f  is greater than or equal to a and, conditional on his information, 2  elieves that the 
4 
expectation is less than a.  ," 
The latter  result  can  be  interpreted  as saying  that  it  cannot  b  common  knowledge  i. 
between two risk-neutral individuals they both expect to profit from a b t:  take f (a)  to be the  .i 
payment frorn individual 1 to individual 2, if  positive, and from 2 to 1, if negative, in case the 
true state turns out to be a.  If  it is common knowledge that they both  xpect to gain from the  e 
bet, then it  is common  knowledge that for 1  the expectation off is  ositive  and  for 2  the 
expectation of  -  f  is positive.  I  ~ 
11.  "No trade" theorems. Along these lines, Milgrorn (1981) and Milgrom Stokey 
(1982) proved a result which is often interpreted as establishing the impos ibility of speculative 
trade. Assume that the two traders agree on an ex ante efficient allocation b  f goods. Then, after 
the traders get new information, there is no transaction with the property t  at it is common  (I  ! 
knowledge that both traders are willing to carry it out.  i 
Morris  (1994)  explores  further  this  "no  trade"  result,  by  1  oking  at  the  case  of  i 
heterngeneom  prior beliefs. He shows  how  different  notions of  efficiency under  asymmetric 
information (ex ante, ex interim and ex post) are related to agents'  prior  eliefs. These efficiency  b 
results are used  to obtain necessary and sufficient conditions on age&'  beliefs for  no  trade 
theorems in different environments. 
/ 
4 
Note, however, that it  is possible that at a state w  it  is common knowledge that i  1 believes that the 
expectation of f  is a and individual 2 believes that it is different from a. For  = {a,  Cj},  I, = (52) 
and Iz  = {{a).  {p)  1. Let p(a)  = p(P)  = $ and f (a)  = 1, f (p)  = 3. Then at a  is it common knowledge that 
for 2 the expectation of f is 2 and for 1 it is different from 2 (it is either 1 or 3).  1 111.  From probabilities of events to aggregates.  In  m  y economic settings,  Bn 
instead  of  assuming  that  individual  opinions  (conditional  or  expectations)  are 
cornrnon knowledge,  it  is  more  natural  to suppose  that  of  individual 
opinions (e.g., a price) becomes common knowledge. In 
5 
pro'ved that if  a stochastically  monotone  aggregate of  individual con  itional  probabilities  is 
cornrnon knowledge, then it is still  true that  all  the conditional  proba  ilities must be equal. 
Nielsen et al (1990) show that also this result - like Aumam's result - can be extended from  I 
conditional probabilities of  an event to conditional expectations of a randob variable. 
Along the same lines, Parikh and  Krasucki (1990) consider co  munication  protocols 
among  more than two individuals  in  which  values of  functions  are c  mmunicated  privately  ! 
through messages: when agent  A communicates  with agent B, other a  ents are not informed 
about the content of  the messa&.  They show that the agent may fail to  6  reach agreement even 
IV.  Communication and common knowledge.  One  ay  in  which common 
knowledge can be achieved is through communication. Suppose that the  tate space is finite.  If  1 
5  n 
A function 4 : [W  +  IR  is stochastically monotone if  it can be written in the form +  ,, ..., xn) = $l(xl)  + .  .. + 
'$"(xn) where each +i:  [W +  [W  is strictly increasing (this definition differs from, but i  to, the one used 
by McKelvey and Page, 1986). 
the agents communicate to each other the probability of an event (or the 
variable, etc.) and revise their information partitions and subjective estimates 
time will be reached after which communication induces no further revision. 
will become common knowledge at every state  that each agent can predict 
hear from the other agent in the future. Then, by  Aumann's  theorem, at 
must  be  the  same.  This  "convergence  to  common  knowledge" 
Gei~nakoplos  and Polemarchakis (1982) and Sebenius and Geanakoplos 
expectation of  a random 
accordingly, then a 
Then at that time it 
the opinion she will 
that time the opinions 
theorem  was  proved  by 
(1883). with reasonable protocols. Krasucki (1996) takes this line of  inquiry a st p further by identifying 
restrictions on protocols which guarantee that agreement is reached. Hei etz (1996) clarifies the  \ 
relationship between consensus and common knowledge in this context.  1 
V.  Errors in information processing. Geanakoplos  (1  89)  and Samet  (1990) 
extend  Aurnann's  (1976)  result  in  a  different  direction.  They  ask  hat  conditions  on  the 
individuals'  information  functions  (or  "possibility  correspondences")  are  sufficient  for  the 
irnrpossibility of  agreeing to disagree. They assume the existence of  a co  mon prior and consider 
posterior  beliefs  obtained  by  updating  the  common  prior  on  no  1  -partitional  possibility 
correspondences  which  represent  how  individuals  process  informatio . In  particular,  Sarnet 
generalizes Aumann's result from the case where the information functi  n of  each individual is 
reflexive and euclidean (and hence transitive) to the case where it is re  exive and transitive. In 
ot.her words, he drips the Negative Introspection axiom for individual  eliefs (see Section 7).  ; 
Thus  he  takes  a  "bounded  rationality"  approach.  Geanakoplos  (1989)  also  focuses  on 
"environments  where  information  processing  is  subject  to  error"  , 
cc~nditions  on  individual beliefs  that ensure  the absence of  speculatic 
6 
disagree".  Geanakoplos, however, goes a step further by providing als 
which he calls "positive balancedness". 
6 
Like Samet, he assumes reflexivity of  the information functions, but replaces transit 
calls "(positive) balancedness". Thus the Truth Axiom (that is, reflexivity of  thc 
individual) plays a crucial role in Geanakoplos' and Samet's analysis. 
nd  finds  even  weaker 
I  and of  "agreement  to 
a necessary condition, 
dy  with a property which he 
information function of each 5.  Non-Bayesian or "Qualitative" generalizatio s of Aumann's  i 
result  ~ 
Cave (1983) and Bacharach (1985) extended Aumann's  result fr m the Bayesian setting  0 
(that is, from the conditional probability of  an event given a common p  or) to the case of  like-  ri 
minded  individuals who follow  a common decision  procedure that  sjisfies the  Sure Thing 
I 
Principle.  Roughly speaking,  they showed  that once  two like-minded agents reach common 
knlowledge of  the actions each of  them intends to perform, they will pe  om  identical actions.  f 
This is illustrated in the following story, which Aumann (1989) attributes lo Bacharach. 
A murder has been committed. To increase the chances of  a con 
chief of  police puts two detectives on the case, with strict instm 
independently and exchange no information. The two, Alice an 
the same police school so given the same clues, they would rea 
conclusions. But as they will work independently, they will, p 
get the same clues.  At the end of  thirty days, each is to decid 
(possibly nobody). On the night before the thirtieth day, they 
the locker room at headquarters, and get to talking about the 
instructions, they exchange no substantive information, no c 
self-confident individuals, and feel that there is no harm in t 
whom they plan to arrest. Thus when they leave the locker r 
knowledge between them whom Alice will arrest, and it is 
between them whom Bob will arrest. Conclusion: They arr 
and this, in spite of  knowing nothing about each other's clues.  1 
52 
Let SZ be a set of  states and denote by 2  the set of  events. Let A b  a finite set of actions.  e 
Q 
I 
A decisionprocedure is a function D :  2 \0 -3 A. The interpretation is that the decision 
procedure D recommends action D(1) E A to ian  individual whose informalion (the set of  states 
he considers possible) is I. What one learns in police school is a decision flrocedure: if you know 
Q 
such and such, then you should do so and so.  The decision procedure D : 2 \0 +  A satisfies the 
Sure Thing Principle, if and only if, for every event E and for every partition {P,, ..., Pm)  of E, 
D(P,) = a for every i == 1,  ...,  m,  implies D(E) = a Intuitively, suppose that if you knew which of the mutually exclusive events Pi happened, you 
would choose action a (which is the same for all P,). Then you will take the same action a if  you 
onty know that some Pi happened, without knowing which one. Thus if  Alice would arrest the 
butler if  a certain blood stain is of type A, B, AB, or 0,  (perhaps for different reasons in each 
case), then she should arrest the butler without bothering to send the stain to the police 
laboratory. 
Given  decision procedure D and individuals i = 1,2 with information partitions < define 
achbnfunctions di : 52 +  A by di(o)  = D(I,(w));  in words, di(o)  is i's action at state o. For every 
ae A, we write  11 d, =a  )I  for the event {w  Q : di(o)  = a). 
Generalized Agreement Theorem (Cave, 1983, Bacharach, 1985). Consider two 
individuals who follow the same decision proc.edure, which satisfies the Sure Thing Principle. If, 
at some state, it is common knowledge that individual 1 plans to take action a and individual 2 
plains to take action b, then they must be planning to take the same action. Formally. 
if  ~,(lld,=all  n~ld,=bll)#@ then  a=b. 
REMARK. Aumann's Agreement Theorem is a corollary of the above: for a fixed event 
E, define the decision procedure DE  by D,(F)  := p(E I F). By Lemma 1 of  Section 3, this decision 
procedure satisfies the Sure Thing Principle. (Similarly, the expectation of a random variable 
satisfies the Sure Thing Principle.) 
Moses and Nachum (1990) point out that Bacharach's technical definition of  the Sure 
Th:ing Principle is considerably stronger than is suggested by the blood type example given 
above. Indeed, "it requires the decision procedure to be defined in a manner satisfying certain 
/ 
corlsistency properties at what amount to impossible situations" (Moses and Nachum, 1990, p. 
152). They provide the following "counterexample" to the Generalized Agreement Theorem. A 
murder was committed and it is known that one of  three suspects, A, B and C is the culprit. Two 
police officers are put on the case and are instructed to act independently and adhere to the 
following decision procedure: 1.  If  you know who the culprit is, indict him; 
2.  If  you know that exactly one of' them is not the culprit, of the other two arrest (for 
further interrogation) the one who comes first in alphabetical order; 
3.  If you cannot rule out any of the three as the culprit, do not arrest anybody. 
This could be expressed formally as follows. For every i E  {A, B, C) let i denote the state where 
individual i is the one who committed the murder. Then, for example, {A) represents the state of 
information of a detective who has established that A is the culprit, and {B, C) is the state of 
information of a detective who has established only that A is not the culprit. Then the above 
decision procedure can be expressed as follows: 
1.  D({A)) = indict A,  D({B)) = indict B,  D({C)) = indict C; 
2.  D({A, B)) = D({A, C}) = arrest A,  D({B, C))  = arrest B; 
3.  D({A, B, C))  = do not arrest anybody. 
This decision procedure satisfies the Sure Thing Principle trivially. Now imagine that detective 
Maigret has not collected any clues, while detective Columbo has established that (and only that) 
C is not the culprit. Columbo therefore initially intends to suggest that A be arrested, while 
Maigret would suggest that no arrests be made. Columbo communicates his intentions to 
Maigret, but Maigret cannot use this information to rule out any suspects and therefore insists on 
suggesting that no arrests be made. In the end it becomes common knowledge between them that 
Columbo intends to arrest A, while Maigret intends to suggest that no arrests be made. Hence 
thely agree to disagree. The situation after their initial communication of intentions can be 
represented using a state space 52 that contains four points: a,  P, y  and 6. At both a and y suspect 
A is the murderer, at f3 the murderer is B, and at 6  the murderer is C. Columbo's information 
pantition is {{a, (31, {a,  y))  while Maigret's information partition is {52).This is illustrated in 
Figure 6. A  B  A  C 
did  did  did  did 
it  it  it  it 
COLUMBO 
MAIGRET 
Figure  6 
By the above decision procedure, D({a,(j)) = D({y,6)) = arrest A and D(Q) = no arrest, thus 
violating Bacharac'l's Sure Thing Principle. Moses and Nachum point out that Bacharach's Sure 
Thing Principle in this case does not capture the intuition which is normally associated with it. 
Indeed, it makes no sense for Columbo to ask himself what he would do if  he had Maigret's 
inlformation, for the following reason. Maigret's information is that (1) either Columbo knows 
that C is not guilty or Columbo knows that B is not guilty, (2) he (Maigret) considers it possible 
th;at C is guilty and considers it possible that B is guilty. If  Columbo were to know what Maigret 
knows (if he had the information Maigret has) then he would find himself believing 
contradictory propositions. Formally, let E = {a, (j} and suppose that the true state is a.  Then 
a E KM(KCE  u  KCYE)  and a E  7K,E  n  lK,4.  For Columbo to be in the same state of 
information at a as Maigret, it would have to be true that a E Kc(KcE u KclE)  and a E 7KcE 
n  lKclE.  By Negative Introspection, -,KcE  c  Kc7KcE  and 7Kc7E  Kc7KclE.  Thus 
a E KclKcE  n  KCIKCIE  = %(7KcE  n  XclE  ) = Kcl(KcE u  Kc7E ). Thus a E KcF n 
Kc-$,  where F = KcE u  KC7E,  contradicting consistency of  knowledge. As Moses and 
Nachum (1990, p. 156) point out, "taking the union of  states of knowledge in which an agent has 
differing knowledge does not result in a state of knowledge in which the agent is more ignorant; 
it simply does not result in a state of  knowledge at all!". Moses and Nachum's criticism of Bacharach's Sure Thing Principle is similar to Gul's 
(1996) and Dekel and Gul's (1997) criticism of' the notion of  a common prior in situations of 
incomplete information (see Section 6) 
In their paper, Moses and Nachum go on to propose a weakening of the Sure Thing 
Principle and find conditions under which the weaker notion yields the impossibility of agreeing 
to disagree. 
6. Common Prior and Agreement in situations of incomplete 
information. 
Th:  assumption of a common prior is central to Aumam's result on agreeing to disagree 
and in related results, such as the no-trade theorem (Milgrom and Stokey, 1982). The Common 
Prior Assumption (CPA) plays an important role also in game theory:  it is the basic assumption 
behind decision-theoretic justifications of equilibrium reasoning in games (Aummn, 1987, 
Aumann and Brandenburger, 1995). Not surprisingly, the CPA has attracted its share of 
criticism. In models of asymmeCric information  (where there is an ex ante stage at which the 
individuals have identical information and subsequently update their beliefs in response to 
priv<ate  signals), the controversy focuses on the plausibility or appropriateness of assuming 
commonness of the prior beliefs (see Morris, 1995). In this section we want to focus on situations 
of incomplete information, where there is no ex  ante stage and where the primitives of  the model 
are the individuals' beliefs about the external world (their first-order beliefs), their beliefs about 
the other individuals' beliefs (second-order beliefs!,  etc., i.e. their hierarchies of beliefs. In this 
context, the CPA is a mathematical property whose conceptual content is not clear. This has 
giyen rise to a novel and, in a way, more radical, criticism of the CPA, one that questions its very 
meaningFLlness in situations of  indomplete information (Dekel and Gul, 1997, Gul, 1996, 
Lipman, 1995). 
The skepticism concerning the CPA in situations of incomplete information can be 
developed along the following lines. As Mertens and Zamir (1985) showed in their classic paper, 
the  description of the "actual world" in terms of belief hierarchies generates a collection of "possible worlds", one of which is the actual world. This set of possible worlds, or states, gives 
rise to a formal similarity between situations of asymmetric information and those of incomplete 
infbrmation.  However, while a state in the former represents a real contingency, in the latter it is 
"a fictitious construct, used to clarify our understanding of  the real world" (Lipman, 1995, p.2), 
"a notational device for representing the profile of infinite hierarchies of beliefs
n (Gul, 1996, p. 
3).  As a result, notions such as that of a common prior, "seem to be based on giving the 
artificially constructed states more meaning than they have" (Dekel and Gul, 1997, p.42). Thus 
an essential step in providing a justification for, say, correlated equilibrium under incomplete 
infbrmation is to provide an interpretation of the "common prior" based on "assumptions that do 
not refer to the constructed state space, but rather are assumed to hold in the true state", that is, 
assumptions "that only use the artificially constructed states the way they originated -  namely as 
elements in a hierarchy of  belief" (Dekel and Gul, 1997, p.116). 
When the beliefs of the individuals can be viewed as if  they were obtained by updating a 
coimmon prior on some information, they are called Harsanyi consistent. Harsanyi consistency is 
a well-defined mathematical property, but, due to the "artificial nature" of the states in situations 
of  incomplete information, "we do not know what it is that we would be accepting if  we were to 
accept the common prior assumption
7' (Gul, 1996, p.5). 
In this section we show that the existence of a common prior can be understood as a 
generalized form of Agreement, which we call Comprehensive Agreement. In order to motivate 
this notion, we take as point of  departure the observation that, in some special cases, it is easy to 
find an interpretation of Harsanyi consistency that does not involve an ex ante stage. In 
particular, in situations of complete information (characterized by the fact that the beliefs of each 
individual are commonly known) Harsanyi consistency amounts to identity of beliefs across 
individuals. It thus seems natural, in situations of incomplete information, to think of Harsanyi 
consistency as likewise amountirig to equality of  those aspects of beliefs that are commonly 
known. For instance, one can take as an aspect of  beliefs the subjective probability of  an event E, 
in which case Agreement reduces to the notion introduced by Aumann (1976). Subjective 
prlobabilities of events are rather special aspects of  beliefs and are not rich enough to fully 
capture the conceptual content of  Harsanyi consistency. Thus one needs a more general notion of Cofirlprehemive  Agreement as the absence of any "agreement to disagree" about aspects of 
beliefs (or belief indices) in an appropriately defined general class. 
In general situations of  incomplete information where some individuals might have false 
beliefs (i.e. in non-partitional models), the relationship between Comprehensive Agreement and 
the existence of a common prior is somewhat complex. To see this, consider the following 
example, illustrated in Figure 7. Individual 2 is an economist who knows the correct spelling of 
his iname (Mas-Colell). Individual 1 mistakenly believes that the spelling is Mas-Collel. She even 
believes this spelling to be common belief between them. These beliefs are represented by state z 
in Figure 7. Note, in particular, that 1's mistaken beliefs are represented with the help of an 
7 
"artificial state" 6 which she believes to obtain for sure at z (hence the arrow from z to 6) . 
spelling:  spelling: 
Mas-Cole11  Mas-Collel 
Figure 7 
In this example Comprehensive Agreement is satisfied at the true state t (and also at P). To see 
this., think of  a belief  index, or aspect of  belief, as a function whose domain is the set of 
probability distributions over {t,  (3).  Let f be any such belief index. Then individual 1's value of 
f is (the same, hence) common belief at every state, in particular at t. Call this value x. Now, 
individual 2's value off at  P must also bex (since they have the same beliefs there). Thus if 2's 
index is common belief at z it mugt be x. Hence at t (and at P), there cannot be agreement to 
disaigree (i.e. commonly known disagreement) about the aspect of beliefs captured by f . 
7 
Th~e  state (3  is defined as the following conjunction of facts about the world and individuals' beliefs: "the correct 
spelling is MasCollel and it is commonly (and correctly) believed to be MasCollel". For more details on the 
"state space" representation of belief hierarchies, see below. Are the beliefs represented by state t  in Figure 7 Harsanyi consistent? This question 
requires clarification, since in an incomplete information setting properties need to be stated 
locdy  as pertaining to a particular profile of  belief hierarchies - represented by the true state 
z -- rather than globally as pertaining to the model as a whole. In a weak sense the question can 
be answered affirmatively: the true state t could be thought of as the ex interim stage of an 
as!rrnmetric information model with a common prior that assigns probability 0 to t  and 
probability 1 to P.  We define a corresponding weak notion of the CPA (Harsanyi Quasi 
Consistency), which in Figure 7 is satisfied at t,  and in Proposition 1 below we show it to be 
equivalent to Comprehensive Agreement. However, Harsanyi Quasi Consistency allows the 
"common prior" to give zero probability to the true state even if  every individual assigns 
positive probability to it (see Figure 9). In such a case the true beliefs are compatible with the 
co~mmon  prior largely due to the lack of  restrictions associated with updating on zero probability 
events. As a result, the beliefs at the true state may be accounted for only incompletely by the 
coimmon prior. A considerably stronger notion (Strong Harsanyi Consistency) requires the 
common prior to assign positive probability to the true state (in Figure 7, this requirement is not 
met). In Proposition 2 we provide the following characterization: Strong Harsanyi Consistency is 
equivalent to the conjunction of Comprehensive Agreement, "Truth of  common belief" (what is 
actually commonly believed is true) and common belief in "Truth about common belief" (if 
somebody believes that E is commonly believed, then E is indeed commonly believed). 
Requiring the "prior" to assign positive probability to the true state (that is, requiring 
Strong Harsanyi Consistency) is what is needed in order to translate to situations of  incomplete 
information probability 1 results based on the Common Prior Assumption obtained in an 
as!ymmetric information context, such as Aumam's (1987) characterization of correlated 
equilibrium. 
We now turn to the formd analysis 8  D  E F  I N  I T I 0  N  1 . An interactive Bayesian model (or Bayesian model, for short)  is a 
tuple 
N=  (1, ..., n) isafinitesetofindividuals.. 
9 
52  is a finite set of states (or possible worlds) .  The subsets of  52  are called events. 
10 
z E 52  is the "true" or "actual"  state  . 
for every individual i~ N, pi : 52 4  A(52) (where A(52) denotes the set of probability 
distributions over 52  ) is a function that specifies herprobabilistic beliefs, satisfying the 
following property  [we use the notation pi+=  rather than pi(a)]  : V a,  p  E 52, 
Thus  p.  E A(8) is individual i's subjective probability distribution at state a and condition 
1.a 
(1)  says that every individual knows her own beliefs. We denote by  (Ip,  = p.  11 the event 
La 
{o  E 9  :  piVw  = pi,.  ). It is clear that the set { llpi = pi,wll  : o  E 52  ] is a partition of  52;  it is 
often referred to as  individual i's  typepartition. 
Given a Bayesian model B, its qualitative ilrteractive beliefframe (or frame, for short) is 
the tuple  = (N,  52,  t, (  Ii lie, ) where N, 52, and r are as in Definition 1 and 
8 
For a similar definition see, for example, Aumann and Brandenburger (1995), Dekel and Gul (1997) and  Stalnaker 
(1994, 1996). 
9 
Finiteness of  52 is a common assumption in the literature (cf. Aurnann, 1987, Aurnann and Brandenburger, 1995, 
Dekel and Gul, 1997, Morris, 1994, Stalnaker, 1994, 1996). Q 
for every individual i~ N,  Pi : Q 4  2  \0  is i'spossibility correspondence, derived from i's 
11 
probabilistic beliefs as follows: 
Pi(a)  =:  supp(p,.,). 
Thus, for every a€  Q,  Pi(a)  is the set of states that individual i considers possible at a. 
R E MA R K  1 . It follows from condition (1) of Definition 1 that the possibility 
conrespondence of every individual i satisfies the following properties (whose interpretation is 
given in Footnote 14): Va,fk Q, 
Transitivity:  if  (3 E I.  (a) then  Pi(@)  5; Pi(a), 
Euclideanness:  if  (3 E  Pi  (a) then  Pi(a) c  Pi(P). 
R  E MA R K  2  (Graphical representation). A non-empty-valued and transitive 
Q 
possibility correspondence P : Q +  2  can be uniquely represented (see Figures 6-10) as an 
12 
asymmetric directed graph  whose vertex set consists of  dsjoirit events (called cells and 
represented as rounded rectangles) and states, and each arrow goes from, or points to, either a 
cell or a state that does not belong to a cell. In such a directed graph, or  E  P(o)  if  and only if 
either o  and o'  belong to the same cell or there is an arrow from o,  or the cell containing o,  to 
cut, or the cell containing a'. Conversely, given a transitive directed graph in the above class 
such that each state either belongs to a cell or has an arrow out of  it, there exists a unique non- 
empty-valued, transitive possibility correspondence which is represented by the directed graph. 
The possibility correspondence is euclidean if and only if all arrows connect states to cells and 
no state is connected by an arrow to more than one cell (for an example of a non-euclidean 
possibility correspondence see the common possibility correspondence P,  of Figure 8 below). 
10 
We have included the true state in the definition of an  interactive Bayesian model in order to stress the 
iinterpretation of  the model as a representation of a particular profile of hierarchies of beliefs. 
11 
If  p~ A@),  supp(p) denotes the support of p , that is, the set of states that are assigned positive probability by p. Finally, if - in addition - the possibility correspondence is reflexive, then one obtains a 
pafitition model where each state is contained in a cell and there are no arrows between cells (as 
is the case, for example, in Figure 6). 
S  Q 
Given a frame and an individual i, i's belief operator Bi : 2  +  2  is defined as follows: 
VE c  SL,  BiE = (WE SL : Ii(o)  EI. B,E can be interpreted as the event that (i.e. the set of states 
at which) individual i believes for sure that event E has occurred (i.e. attaches probability 1 to 
E).') 
Notice that we have allowed for false beliefs by not assuming reflexivity of  the 
possibility correspondences (V a€  8,  a E Pi(a)),  which -as is well known (Chellas, 1984, p. 
164) - is equivalent to the Truth Axiom (if the individual believes E then E is indeed true): V E 
14  cG!,  BiEcE . 
The common belief operator B,  is defined as follows. First, for every EcQ,  let BeE = 
n B.E ,  that is, BeE is the event that everybody believes E. The event that E is commonly 
itzN 
believed is defined as the infinite intersection: 
12 
A directed graph is asymmetric if, whenever there is an arrow from vertex v to vertex v'  then there is no arrow 
flrom v'  to v. 
13 
/ 
Thus Condition (1) of  Definition 1 can be stated as follows: V icz  N, V~E  52, !!pi  = piall = Bill  pi = P,.~II. 
14 
It is well known (see Chellas, 1984, p. 164) that nonempty-valuedness of  the possibility correspondence is 
equivalent to consistency of  beliefs (an individual cannot simultaneously believe E and not E): V E c  52, 
1S.E E -IB.TE (where, for every event F, TF denotes the complement of  F).  Transitivity of the possibility 
correspondence is equivalent topositive introspection of  beliefs (if the individual believes E then she believes 
that she believes E):  V E cr-  52,  BiE c  B.B.E.  Finally, euclideanness  of  the possibility correspondence is 
I  I 
equivalent to negative introspection of  beliefs (if the individual does not believe E, then she believes that she 
dloes not believe E): V E G 52,  7BiE  c  Bi7BiE. Thle  corresponding possibility correspondence P,  is then defined as follows:  for every a E Q, 
P,(a) = (  o  E 8  : a E lB,l{o)  ). It is well known that P .  can be characterized as the transitive 
closure  of  U  f: ,  that is, 
kN 
Va,P E Q,  p E P,(a)  if and only if  there is a sequence ( i,, ... im) in N and a 
sequence (q,,  qI,  ..., q,)  in Q such that: (i) q, = a, (ii) q,  = f3 and (iii) for every k = 0, 
Note that, although P,  is always non-empty-valued and transitive, in general it need not 
be euclidean (despite the fact that the individual possibility correspondences are: for an example 
see Figure 8; recall that -cf.  Footnote 14 - F',  is euclidean if  and only if  B,  satisfies Negative 
Introspection). 
Events represent propositions and a state determines, for each individual, her beliefs 
about the external world (her first-order belief's), her beliefs about the other individuals' beliefs 
about the external world (her second-order beliefs), her beliefs about their beliefs about her 
beliefs (her third-order beliefs), and so on, ad infiniturn. An entire hierarchy of beliefs about 
beliefs about beliefs ... about the relevant facts is thus encoded in each state of an interactive 
be1 ief model. For example, consider the following model, which is illustrated in Figure 8 
according to the convention established in Remark 2: N = (1. 21,  R = {r, (3,  y, 61, p,,%  = p  = 
1  ,Y 
the event (6, r ,y)  represents the proposition '"it is sunny" and event (6) the proposition "it is 
cloudy". The true state z describes a world where in fact it is sunny, individual 2 believes that it 
is :sunny and believes that 1 also believes it is sunny (indeed he believes that this is common 
belief), but in fact 1 believes that it is sunny with probability  f  and cloudy with probability  4 
and believes that also 2 is uncertain as to whether it is sunny or cloudy (and attaches equal 
probability to both), etc. Conversely, given any profile of infinite hierarchies of beliefs (one for each individual) 
satisfying minimal coherency requirements, one can construct an interactive Bayesian model 2? 
such that at the hue state z  the beliefs of each individual i~ N fully capture i's original infinite 
hierarchy of  beliefs (see Boege and Eisele, 1979, Brandenburger and Dekel, 1993, Mertens and 
15 
Zamir, 1985, and Battigalli, 1997)  . 
sunny  sunny  sunny  cloudy 
Figure  8 
It is not obvious what a proper local formulation of  the existence of  a "common prior" 
ouglht to be. Below we suggest two definitions. The first turns out to be equivalent to a 
generalized notion of  Agreement, but is too weak in some respects. The second,  stronger, 
definition is more appealing but is no longer equivalent to Agreement. 
15 
Finiteness of  Q, however, cannot be guaranteed in general. D E  Fl  N IT  I0  N  2.  For every p~ A(Q), let HQCp (for  Harsanyi  Quasi Consistency 
with respect to the  'prior"  p) be the following event: a E HQCp  if and only if 
(1)  Vi  s N,  Vw,wr  s P,(a),  if  p(llpi = p,,ll)  > 0  then pi,,(wt)  = 
p  (0') 
if 
p(Ilpi = Pi,,ll) 
O'E  lipi = pi,,ll  and  pi,,(wf)  =  0 otherwise (that  is,  pi,,  is obtained from  p  by 
16 
conditioning on  11 pi = pi,, 11 )  , and 
If a E  HQCp, p is a local common prior  at a.  Furthermore, let  HQC  =  U  HQC, . 
PEAW 
We now define formally a general notion of  agreement. Agreement as equality of beliefs 
is essentially a two-person property. Hence, for the remaining part of this section, we specialize 
to the case where N = {1,2). 
17 
Let X  be a set with at least two elements. A belief index is a function f :  A(Q) +  X  . 
E 
EX  A M  P L  E 1 . (i) Let E E S2  be an arbitrary event, X = [0,1] and  f  the followiilg 
E  E 
belief index: f  (p) = p(E) ;  thus f  (pi,a)  is individual i's subjective probability of event E at 
(ii)  Let Y : 8  -+ (W be a random variable, X = IW and fy be the belief index given by 
fy  (p)  =  Y(w)~(w).  ;  thus fy  (pi, ) is i's subjec~ive  expectation of  Y at state a. 
042 
16 
Where.  for  every  event  E.  p(E) =  p(O)  .  Note  that.  for  every o  E  Q  and  i  E  N. o  E  !Ipi  =  pi,ull.  Thus 
WEE 
p(~)  > 0 implies p(lIpi  = P,,~II)  > 0. 
17 
It may seem that a belief index f depends on the set of states Q. However, this is not so: one should think of  f 
as being defied  on the "universal belief space" (cf..  Mertens and Zarnir, 1985). Indeed, all that matters is the 
restriction of  f  to  P,(t). A 
(iii)  Let A be a set of  actions, X  = 2  and U : A x 52  +  iW a utility function. Define the 
A 
belief index f, :  A(52) -+ 2  as follows: fu(p) =  argmax  U(a,w)  p(o) . Thus f,(p,,J  is 
a.4  wsS2 
the set of actions that maximize individual i's expected utility at state a. 
D  E  F l  N l  T I0  N 3.  A belief index is proper if  and only if  it satisfies the following 
property: Vp,  q  E A  (51)  , VEX,  VUE  [0,1], 
if f (p) =  f (q) = x  then f (ap + (1 -a)q) =  n. 
Let.3,  denote the class of proper belief indices. 
It is easily verified that all the belief indices of Example 1 are proper. 
Given a proper belief index f : A(S2) +  X  and an individual i~ N, definefi :  52  -+  X by 
f;(a.)  = /(pi,a). For every XEX  denote the event {as  S2 : &(a)  =x) by  I[/; =XI[. 
D E F  I  N  IT  I0  N 4.  Given a Bayesian model and a proper belief index f: A(Q) +  X, at 
a E 52  there is Agreement for f  or f-Agreement  if  and only if,  for all x,, x~EX, 
That is,  if  at a it is common belief that individual 1's belief index is x, and individual 2's index 
is xi!, then x, = x,.  Correspondingly, define the following event: 
Given a Bayesian model and a set 3 of  proper belief indices, at a there is Agreement on 
3 or  3-~~reement  if  and only if, V  f  E 3,  a E  f-Agree. Correspondingly, let A general notion of agreement is given by the entire class of proper belief indices. 
D  E Fl  N l  T  lo  N 5.  Let CA (for Comprehensive Agreement) be the following event: 
CA  = JW-Agree. 
The following proposition (proved in Bonanno and Nehring, 1996) characterizes 
Coinprehensive Agreement as equivalent to Harsanyi Quasi Consistency. 
PROPOSITION 1.  CA  = HQC. 
The notion of  Harsanyi Quasi Consistency is rather weak: it allows the "common prior" 
to assign zero probability to the true beliefs of all the individuals (even if  none of  the individuals 
has false beliefs: Example 2) and it is compatible with some individuals believing that there is 
agreement to disagree (Example 3). 
EX  A M  P  L E 2. Consider the model of  Figure 9. Let p E A(Q) be such that p((j) = 1. 
Then HQCp  = Q. Thus at r Harsanyi Quasi Consistency is satisfied even though the type 
(beliefs) of  each individual is assigned zero probability by p. Note that at t both individuals have 
correct beliefs (t  E PI  (1) n  P2(r)). Figure  9 
EX  A M  P L E 3. Consider the model of Figure 8. Let p  E A(Q) be such that p((J)  = 1. 
Then HQCp  = {r,  (3).  At r Harsanyi Quasi Consistency is satisfied even though individual 1 
believes that he and 2 "agree to disagree" about the probability that it is sunny (that is, 1 believes 
that it is common belief that he himself attaches probability' 113 to the event {P, r, y} while 2 
attaches probability 1/2 to it). 
In view of the above examples, Harsanyi Quasi Consistency is too weak a notion to allow 
the translation to situations of  incomplete information of  results that are based on the Common 
Prior Assumption, such as Aumam's (1987) characterization of correlated equilibrium. In order 
to strengthen the notion of  Harsanyi Quasi Consistency one needs to tighten the connection 
between the implied prior and the true beliefs /state. The following definition does so by 
requ.iring the prior to assign positive probability to the true state. 
I D  E F  I  N l  T I0  N 6.  For every p~ A(P),  let SHCp  (for Strong Harsanyi Consistency 
with respect to the "prior" p) be the following event: a  E SHCp  if and only if 
(1)  aeHQCp,  and 
Furthermore, let SHC =  U  SHC, . 
peAW 
To explore the gap between HQC and SHC or we introduce the following events (TCB 
* 
stands for Truth about common belief, T  stands for Truth of  common belief,  while NI stands 
for Negative Introspection of  common belief :I: 
Tc. captures the notion that  individuals an:  correct  in  their beliefs  about  what is  commonly 
believed: a  E TcB  if and only if, for every event E and individual i,  if, at a, individual i believes 
that E is commonly believed, then, at a,  E is  indeed commonly believed (if  a€BiB,E  then 
* 
a€:  B,E). On the other hand, a€  T  if  and only if  at a  whatever is commonly believed is true (for 
18 
every event E, if  a€  B,E  then a€  E)  . Clearly, Truth of  common belief is qualitatively weaker 
/  *  * 
than Truth; given  that B,T  = S2,  T  can be viewed  as Truth  shorn  of  any  intersubjective 
18 
It is straightforward that a€  T  if and only if, a€  I,(a). implications.  Finally, a  E NI  if and only if  - for every event E -  whenever at a  it is not 
19 
coirnmon belief that E, then, at a, it is common belief that E is not commonly believed. 
The following proposition follows from results proved in Bonanno and Nehring (1996, 
19'97) 
PROPOSITION 2.  SHC = HQC~T'~B,T_  = HQC~T~~NI. 
7.  Qualitative agreement 
In this section we show that the qualitative counterpart to Harsanyi Quasi Consistency is 
the: property of  quasi-coherence of beliefs denoted by Q. First, let T (for Truth) be the following 
event: 
Thus, for every a  E  52,  a E T if  and only if' no individual has any false beliefs at a  (for every 
20 
i~ IV  and for every E G St, if  a€  B,E then a E  E) . Let Q (for Quasi-Coherence) be the following 
event: 
Q captures the notion of  Agreement on qualitative belief indices, as we now show. Among the 
proper belief  indices defined  in  the previous section, of  particular  interest  are the following 
special cases: simple  indices, which take on only two values, 0 and 1, and qualitative indices, 
/ 
19 
It  is well known that a E NI  if  and only if  P*(a)  satisfies the following property: V (3,  y e P*(a), y E PI(@. 
20 
It is well known that ae  T if  and only if  ae ne  (a)  . It follows that a€  B,T  if  and only if, for all (k P,(a). 
ie N 
P. new. 
&N which depend only on the support of  p E A@).  We denote the first class by  x2  and the latter by 
3,.  Thus 
3, = { f:  A(Q) -+ X : (i) f E 3- , (ii) X = (0, 1)  and (iii) f -'  (1)  is closed 1  (5) 
The following results are proved in Bonanno and Nehring (1996). 
P R 0  P 0  S l  T I0  N  3. f E 32  if  and only if there exists a random variable Y : SL -+  R 
1  if  Y(o)p(o)  2 0 
such that, for all p~ A(Q), f(p) =  OEQ 
0  otherwise 
R E MAR  K  3.  A qualitative  belief  index  can  be written as  f = d  0  supp,  with  f 
Q 
dl  : 2  \ 0 -t X  (such functions df  have been studied  in  Rubinstein and Wolinsky, 1990). A 
qualitative belief index  is proper if  and only if  df  is  union consistent, that is, 
Note that since the events El, ..., ENm  are not assumed  to be  pairwise  disjoint, union 
corisistency is a stronger property than the Sure Thing Principle defined by Bacharach (1985). 
1  if supp(p)  c_  E 
Fix an  event E + 0 and consider  the following  index:  f,(p)  = 
0  otherwise 
A 
2  1 
Thus, for every  individual i and state a, fE(pi,J  = 1 if  and only  if  a E  BiE .  Let  3  = 
LI 
To represent  fE  in  the  manner  of  Proposition  3,  let  Y  :  Q  -+  [W  be  as  follows:  Y  =  YE-  1,  where 
lE: 52  4  {0,1)  is  the  characteristic  function  of  E:  lE(w) =  1  if  and  only  if  WEE.  Hence A 
{f,  :' A(Q) -t {0,1} : E E Q ). Clearly,  3 E 3, n TQ. The following proposition shows that in 
A 
fact 3 coincides with YQ n T2. 
h 
PROPOSITION 4.  3 =  3an32. 
* 
Note that a E 3 -Agree if  and only if, for no event E, a E  B,(B,E  n 7B2E), that is, there 
is no event about which the two individuals "agree to disagree": 
A 
LEMMA 1.  Vae  St,  a€  J-~~ree  ifandonlyif 
As a corollary to Lemma 1 we get that quasi-coherence of  beliefs rules out agreeing to 
disagree about events. 
A 
COROLLARY I.  Q  3-Agree. 
The converse to Corollary 1 does not hold. To see this, consider the frame illustrated in 
A 
Figure 10. By  Lemma 1,  3 -Agree = St;  on the other hand,  Q  = 0 (in fact, T = {z,  and, 
therefore, B,T  = 0;  thus TB,TB,T  = 0). 
'Y(w)  =  0  ifw~E  .  Then  x~(w)p(w)  = 1  Y(w)p(w)  = - xp(w) < 0 if and only if  p(w) > 0  for 
-1  ifweE  ~~s-2  WE-E  WC-E 
s;ome OE-E,  if and  only if  p(o) <  1. 
wcE Figure  10 
To obtain a full characterization of quasi-coherence one needs to consider the entire class 
of' qualitative belief indices. 
PROPOSITION 5.  Q = xQ-Agree. 
A 
It follows from Proposition 5 and the above example that  3 -Agree t TQ-Agree.  Thus, 
in contrast to the case of general "quantitative" proper belief indices, for which simplicity can be 
assumed without loss of generality (i.e. ?--~gree  = 3,-Agree: see Bonanno and Nehring, 1996). 
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